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The goal of this paper is to identify the role economic infrastructure 
development plays in stability operations and potential vulnerabilities 
that arise in the implementation of these projects that an insurgency can 
exploit. The questions I attempt to answer in my research are: What 
overall trends lead to the failure of economic infrastructure projects? 
What are the sources of these failures? How do failures in these projects 
create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an insurgency and pose a 
risk to the US while conducting stability operations? I hypothesized that 
infrastructure projects do create vulnerabilities which can be exploited 
by the insurgency and will have an effect on the mission of the United 
States. Evidence shows that these vulnerabilities are caused by the host 
nation, the social environment that is being worked in, and the US 
Government. The first chapter focuses on the sustainability of economic 
development projects in terms of the capacity of the government. 
Research concluded that if the agency or contractor implementing the 
project does not take into consideration the capacity of the host nation 
government to sustain the project, whether it is due to lack of funds to 
maintain the project, or lack of expertise, then the project will likely fail. 
The second chapter questions US oversight of economic development 
projects. It was found that consequences for lack of oversight on a 
project include the failure to adhere to the project plan, failure to quickly 
identify problems or mistakes, and/or failure to remedy mistakes in a 
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timely manner. Projects without proper oversight failed either in the 
sense that they cost the US government more money or that they had no 
beneficial effect on the surrounding region. The third chapter analyzes 
the extent to which US agencies hold contractors accountable for their 
projects. It was determined that if contractors are not held accountable 
for their projects, they are likely to build low quality structures, exceed 
the designated budget, or need additional time to complete the project. In 
the fourth chapter, an assessment is made on the effect these failures 
have on the perception and behavior of the local population and the 
legitimacy of the host nation government and US / Allied forces operating 
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Introduction 
 
“For the United States, supporting international development is more than 
just an expression of our compassion. It is a vital investment in the free, 
prosperous, and peaceful international order that fundamentally serves 
our national interest.” 
-Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
 
US conflicts today are more likely to be unconventional in nature and 
often include counterinsurgency operations aimed at non-state actors 
who violently oppose the host nation government. Legitimacy is often 
used as one determinant of success. To support that government, the US 
conducts stability operations to address the drivers of conflict. These 
operations include economic infrastructure development projects which 
are designed to stabilize local and national economies and provide 
employment opportunities for the population. However, when these 
development projects are implemented during an active insurgency, any 
deficiencies in the projects are often exploited by the insurgent group to 
illustrate the deficiencies of the government. This study analyzes stability 
operations, concentrating on economic infrastructure development 
projects, which are conducted in support of counterinsurgency 




What overall trends lead to the failure of economic infrastructure 
projects? What are the sources of these failures? How do failures in these 
projects create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an insurgency and 
pose a risk to the US while conducting stability operations? 
Variables 
 
This study discusses two dependent variables: success of economic 
infrastructure development projects and legitimacy of the host nation 
government.  The independent variables tested in relationship to 
economic infrastructure development projects are capacity, 




are three key 
factors affecting the 
potential for success. The relationship between these variables is based 
on their influence at different stages of the implementation of the 
project. Host nation capacity must be considered at the design phase to 
ensure sustainability. Oversight is conducted while the project is being 
constructed to ensure that it stays within the allotted budget and time 
and ensures effectiveness in a dynamic environment. Accountability is 
exercised upon the project's completion to recognize and correct 
Figure 1 Top Influences in Project Phases 
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mistakes from the implementation phase and allow for the issuance of 
reprimands where necessary. The second dependent variable is the 
legitimacy of the host nation government, and the independent variable 
is the success or failure of economic development projects. 
Stability Operations 
 
Stability operations have been conducted by the United States as a 
method to eliminate the drivers of conflict while simultaneously building 
the capabilities of the host nation to manage and govern. In Army Field 
Manual 3-07, a stability operation is defined as a “process in which 
personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to 
establish the conditions for long-term stability.”1 This goal is 
accomplished by improving the capacity of host nation institutions in an 
effort to promote sustainable peace and prevent conflicts from 
remerging.2 Due to the diversity of issues which need to be addressed, 
stability operations require a “Whole of Government” approach in which 
the United States relies on the expertise of its different executive offices 
(Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, etc.) to address 
sources of instability. This approach was instituted by President Bill 
Clinton in 1997 with the Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD/NSC-
44) and by President George W. Bush in 2005 with the National Security 
Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). In a more mission focused 
                                                          
1 Stability. Vol. FM 3-07. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2014. 
2 Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2009. 
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mentality, the Whole of Government approach coincides with a “Unity of 
Effort,” meaning that all actors located in an area of operation, whether 
government or nonprofit, are coordinating with each other to complete 
the objectives required to stabilize the country.3 For the purpose of this 
paper, stability operations are referred to in the context of 
counterinsurgency operations in a post conflict environment. 
Stability operations are important because they serve the strategic 
interests of the United States. Insurgent warfare is becoming a menacing 
issue all over the world. In the Middle East, the Islamic State has taken 
over portions of both Syria and Iraq, and Al Qaeda has destabilized 
Yemen. In Africa, Boko Haram has taken massive amounts of territory 
from various countries and slaughtered thousands. In Ukraine, rebels 
have taken over eastern portions of the country, forcing the government 
to respond militarily. Conflict has a devastating effect on the local and 
regional economies, forcing people to rely on subsistence farming and 
humanitarian aid and displacing large portions of the population.4 With 
stability operations, the US can address the underlying causes of the 
insurgencies and strengthen the host nation, enabling it to better 
support its population by providing the public services needed to govern 
a country and improving the economy. Achieving these goals uplift 
portions of the population who are susceptible to recruitment from 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Crane, Keith. Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009. 
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insurgencies and improves the overall economic and social wellbeing of 
the country. Economic improvement is promoted by infrastructure 
development, which enhances economic opportunity, increases support 
for the host nation government, and eliminates some of the strongest 
sources of conflict.5 The goal of economic development is to establish a 
sustainable economy that is predictable, regulated, and produces 
employment.6 
This paper will focus on stability operations in countries with ongoing 
counterinsurgency missions, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
stability operations in a counterinsurgency context are described by the 
United States Army in Field Manual 3-07 as a struggle for legitimacy and 
influence.7 Legitimacy is the degree to which the local population 
supports the host nation government, the mission of the assisting force, 
and the mandate in which the government or assisting force has gained 
its power.8 There are three phases to stability operations in a post 
conflict environment. The first phase requires the military to deliver basic 
government functions, such as providing access to clean water and 
sanitation. The second phase requires the military to return the 
responsibility of governance to civilian authorities, such as the US State 
Department or the host nation government. The third phase has a full 
                                                          
5 Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. Winning Hearts and Minds 
through Development? World Bank, 2012. 
6 ADP 3-07: Stability. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2012. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2009. 
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transfer of all responsibility of government to the host nation.9 In 
counterinsurgency environments, the host nations often do not have the 
capacity to defeat an insurgency.10 The size of the assisting military force 
and the scope of the mission are dependent on the host nation’s capacity 
to handle its security situation. Consequently, the more unstable and 
unpredictable the environment, the more resources needed and the more 
broadened the scope of the mission.11 
When conducting these operations, it is important that actions taken at 
the local level be consistent with the goals at the national level.12  It 
would be counterproductive to pursue goals at the local level that clash 
with the goals of the rest of the country. It is also necessary to complete 
activities that complement and reinforce other related activities in 
neighboring areas for a regional holistic approach. Additionally, setting 
realistic expectations and demands for the host nation is necessary when 
creating development goals. The host nation government is often severely 
limited in capacity; therefore any timetable that is too short will result in 
the project not being completed or being rushed to completion at the 
expense of quality.  
In a post conflict environment, the lack of resources fuels instability. For 
example, the lack of access to clean drinking water can cause more harm 
                                                          






to civilians, through the spreading of disease, than violence. Competition 
for scarce resources can contribute to more violence or even large scale 
civil conflict.13 Therefore, the restoration of public services is needed from 
the outset to allow people to return to their normal daily lives. The 
conflict is dependent on the perceptions of the citizens.14 Stability 
operations attempt to transform the conflict so that the host nation is 
able to reach a level of self-sufficiency, whereby it can address the 
sources of conflict without the assistance of outside partners. The overall 
goal is to instill stable governance. Stability occurs when the government 
is able to provide public goods, can hold itself accountable, has 
established its own form of rule of law, has freedom of press, and 
includes all members of society within its government.15 
Economic Infrastructure Development  
 
Economic infrastructure development garners support for the host 
nation government by removing sources of instability that often fuel an 
insurgency.16 17 Infrastructure development is vital in raising a country 
out of poverty and into a self-sustaining economy by providing public 
goods such as roads, seaports, and airports which are needed to move 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. Winning Hearts and Minds 
through Development? World Bank, 2012. 
15 Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2009. 
16 Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. Winning Hearts and Minds 
through Development? World Bank, 2012. 
17 Crane, Keith. Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009. 
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goods within and outside a country. It is also necessary for increasing 
employment, improving access to markets, and advancing business 
opportunities. If a business does not have the electricity to power its 
factories or the rail or roadways to send its goods to the market, it will 
not be prosperous. Even with an agriculturally based economy, improved 
water infrastructure allows for more efficient irrigation, cutting down on 
waste and assisting countries that are often affected by drought.18  
Economic development is also needed to infuse important revenue and 
capital into local economies. A bolstered economy benefits local 
government through increased tax revenue on items such as income and 
property.19 There is a downside to this influx of capital, however; it 
usually attracts more people into the area, which the local infrastructure 
might not be able to handle, thereby decreasing the quality of life in the 
area. There is a period of time during when tax revenue will not meet the 
demands of the increased population. Over time, however, as 
infrastructure development catches up to the population influx, spending 
will decrease and available revenue will increase.  
In a counterinsurgency environment, quick impact development projects 
are essential to keeping individuals employed and improving quality of 
life. These projects, which include drilling wells to provide water, 
                                                          
18 Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2009. 
19 Morgan, Jonathan. "Analyzing the Benefits and Costs of Economic Development 
Projects." Community and Economic Development Bulletin, no. 7 (2010). 
9 
 
constructing schools for education, and building health clinics to tend to 
the medical needs of the local population, are especially necessary in 
areas where the host nation lacks legitimacy and needs immediate 
support from the local population. 20 A side effect of these public works 
projects is creating cohesion through mutual interest. All parties tend to 
receive some level of benefit through the development of these projects, 
whether it’s the government gaining legitimacy or the local population 
receiving a health clinic. Either way, it is in the interest of all parties 
involved to cooperate with each other in order to build lasting 
relationships.21 
As a side note, there is extensive debate as to whether foreign aid is 
beneficial to the stability and economic improvement of a host nation. 
For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that economic development 
projects sponsored by outside donors are somewhat beneficial to the host 
nation government. 
Literature Review  
 
Most donor countries implement projects without considering the long 
term costs which must be borne by the host nation once the donor 
nation has left. The relationship that presents itself here is between the 
capacity of a host nation and the sustainability of a development project. 
                                                          
20 Franke, Volker. "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability 
Operations." International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 2 (2006). 
21 Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2009. 
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This relationship constitutes a major issue in Afghanistan, especially 
pertaining to their road network. The United States has built so many 
roads in Afghanistan that the Deputy Minister of Public Works 
recommended that the US halt the construction of roads because their 
government does not have the resources to maintain their current road 
network.22 This lack of capacity to sustain a project presents a 
significant problem for countries with active insurgencies or new 
governments because it damages their legitimacy as a government and 
fuels the public perception of their weakness in handling hostile actors.  
There is a strong correlation between lack of oversight and failure of 
projects. Poor oversight of projects provides a greater opportunity for 
diversion from the original plan or cutting corners to save money and 
increase profit. The result is a project that either needs to be repaired or 
completely redone. If repairs are not made, most likely the project will be 
operating in an insufficient manner or operations will cease altogether. In 
many instances, no one is held accountable for the failed project, 
resulting in more exploitation of donor funds.  
Another reoccurring relationship is the failure of development projects 
and the lack of specialized labor found in underdeveloped and developing 
countries. Without specialized or technical labor, host nations do not 
have the expertise and knowledge needed to sustain complicated 
                                                          
22 "Fiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Projects Are Behind Schedule and 
Lack Adequate Sustainment Plans." Office of the Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR). Accessed March 2, 2014. 
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projects, such as hospitals and power plants. One theory that attempts 
to explain the lack of skilled labor in underdeveloped countries is the 
Brain Drain Theory, in which non-government organizations (NGOs) 
operating in a host nation attract the highly qualified workers with 
substantially higher pay, who leave the public sector and take their 
expertise with them.23  
There is a parallel between the desire for people to learn a general skill 
and the lack of specialized skill in a host nation’s labor pool. General 
skill training, such as construction, allows individuals in a highly volatile 
labor market to easily move between unemployed to employed status due 
to their skills being applicable to many different jobs.24 Another cause of 
the shortage of skilled labor is the lack of an educational infrastructure, 
which itself is a development project. If the education infrastructure is 
not in place already, creating one can be extremely expensive and a 
strain on the already limited amount of skilled labor.25 
There is extensive literature written on development projects and the 
reasons for their success. Many authors have assessed the outcome of 
development projects specifically pertaining to US government agencies, 
such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
                                                          
23 Buss, Terry, and Adam Gardner. National Academy of Public Administration, "Why 
Foreign Aid to Haiti Failed." Last modified 2006. Accessed March 2, 2014.  
24 Ianchovichina, Elena, Antonio Estache, Renaud Foucart, Gregoire Garsous, and Tito 
Yepes. World Development, "Job Creation through Infrastructure Investment in the 
Middle East and North Africa." Last modified 2012. Accessed March 2, 2014.  
25 Drummond, Jane, and Pavao Stefanovic. "Transfer of High Technology to Developing 
Countries." International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth Sciences. . Accessed 
March 2, 2014. 
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and the Department of Defense (DoD), while other authors have analyzed 
development projects in general (including projects from US agencies, 
international organizations, and nonprofits) and how the management of 
these projects effected the outcome. Sheryl Lewis, in her article "Capacity 
Development - The Pathway to Self-Reliance for Host Nations," contends 
that capacity development plays such an important role in US assistance 
that it is currently being addressed by both the State Department and 
DoD.26 She uses the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as 
an example of an agency that has historically focused on capacity 
improvement to address private and public sector management and 
argues its necessity in sustaining development projects. Andrew Natsios 
suggests in “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development” 
that the roles of the State Department, USAID, and DoD, since the 
attacks on September 11th, have become more in sync with each other 
due to the security implications development has on the theatres of 
operation the US finds itself in today.27 He argues that one agency 
cannot do its job without the coordination of the others, indicating the 
importance of development in today’s environment. Both authors 
emphasize the significance of development for US national security and 
the necessity for focusing on capacity building as a way to sustain 
development operations.  
                                                          
26 Lewis, Sheryl. 2011. "Capacity Development -- The Pathway to Self-Reliance for Host 
Nations." Engineer 41, no. 1: 61. Accessed October 6, 2014. 
27 Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." Strategic 
Studies Institute. January 1, 2005. Accessed October 4, 2014. 
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Authors Khang Do Ba and Moe Tun Lin in their article, "Success Criteria 
and Factors for International Development Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based 
Framework," identify a lack of data on the completion of the “not-for-
profit” development project.28 The authors address the stages in the 
development project, which are conceptualizing, planning, implementing, 
and closing or completing. They also claim that there are three problems 
regarding development projects: a knowledge gap between donors and 
recipients; the lack of efficient management; and the lack of financial 
accountability. In the article "Project Management for Development in 
Africa: Why Projects Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It," 
Lavagnon Ika identifies various “traps” into which international 
development projects can fall.29 These traps include the one-size-fits-all 
technical trap, the accountability-for-results trap, the lack-of-project-
management-capacity trap, and the cultural trap. Ika suggests that to 
overcome these traps, focus needs to be placed on solutions establishing 
the managing of objectives for long term results, increasing supervision 
efforts, and tailoring projects to the culture of the host nation.  
Tango International, a company that provides technical assistance to 
non-government organizations, emphasizes in its publication, 
“Sustainability of Rural Development Projects,” the importance of 
                                                          
28 Do Ba, Khang, and Moe Tun Lin. 2008. "Success Criteria and Factors for 
International Development Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based Framework." Project 
Management Journal 39, no. 1: 72-84. Accessed October 6, 2014. 
29 Ika, Lavagnon A. 2012. "Project Management for Development in Africa: Why Projects 
Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It." Project Management Journal 43, no. 4: 
27-41. Business Source Complete. Accessed October 6, 2014. 
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assessing the environment of the host nation government to determine 
what type of project needs to be completed.30 The company states that 
often there is a lack of consideration for issues such as infrastructure 
and financial services. Community involvement is also important for the 
sustainability of a project in an area that lacks infrastructure, since the 
residents will be the only ones responsible for maintaining the project 
once it is completed. Zachery Patterson, in “The Reality of Development: 
A Critique of the Current International Development Policies," supports 
Tango International’s argument by stating that the US needs to focus 
less on “macro” policies and more on policies that address specific issues 
related to development such as cultural and social realities.31 He claims 
that “macro approaches ignore micro issues.” 
Micro policies can be reduced to the project management aspect of a 
development project. Young Hoon, in the “Critical Success Factors in 
International Development Project Management," contends that the 
political landscape, legal institutions, and culture need to be considered 
in the project planning phase of a development project, or problems can 
arise during the implementation that could have been prevented.32  
                                                          
30 "Sustainability of Rural Development Projects." IFAD. Accessed November 5, 2014. 
31 Patterson, Zachary. "The Reality of Development: A Critique of the Current 
International Development Policies." IPAA 2009 International Public Affairs Conference. 
January 1, 2010. Accessed October 4, 2014. 
32 Hoon Kwak, Young. "Critical Success Factors in International Development Project 
Management." George Washington University. Accessed October 4, 2014. 
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Kamrul Ahsan and Indra Gunawan assert in an “Analysis of Cost and 
Schedule Performance of International Development Projects” that delays 
in the completion of a project constitute one of the biggest setbacks for a 
development project.33 Lavagnon A. Ika, Amadou Diallo, and Denis 
Thuillier, in their article “Critical Success Factors for World Bank 
Projects: An Empirical Investigation,” attempt to identify factors that 
prevent the delays that Ahsan and Gunawan have acknowledged.34 These 
factors include monitoring, coordination, design, training, and 
institutional environment, with an emphasis on monitoring and design. 
Amadou Diallo and Denis Thuillier in their piece “The Success of 
International Development Projects, Trust and Communication: An 
African Perspective,” provide a more narrow approach to project 
management, looking at the people rather than the project. They 
determined that good communication, referred to as the flow of 
information between actors, at all levels of the project leads to success. 
In “The Success Dimensions of International Development Projects: The 
Perceptions of African Project Coordinators,” these same authors contend 
that evaluating the success of a project is dependent upon the definition 
                                                          
33 Kamrul Ahsan, Indra Gunawan, Analysis of cost and schedule performance of 
international development projects, International Journal of Project Management, 
Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 68-78, ISSN 0263-7863. 
34 Lavagnon A. Ika, Amadou Diallo, Denis Thuillier, Critical Success Factors for World 
Bank Projects: An Empirical Investigation, International Journal of Project 
Management, Volume 30, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 105-116, ISSN 0263-7863. 
16 
 
of success and the individual conducting the evaluation.35 They argue 
that it is important to determine the goals of the project early in the 
planning phase, thereby establishing the achievements that constitute 
the successful completion of the project.   
Legitimacy is often needed as the basis for authority in a nation and as a 
principled requirement for inclusion in the international community. The 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
broken down legitimacy into two models: The Western Model and the 
non-Western Model. With the Western Model, the state has control over 
population and territory, is responsible for providing services, and has 
international recognition. The state and the citizenry cooperate, and 
legitimacy is obtained through social interaction. Citizens provide capital 
for the state to run its affairs. In the non-Western Model, relations stem 
from personal relations, family, and community. Public goods are 
distributed to particular groups rather than to everyone and political and 
economic rights rely on personal ties rather than economic 
competition.36 In this theory, Iraq and Afghanistan are considered hybrid 
states, in which the states have a historical foundation of providing 
legitimacy through the non-Western Model but currently are acquiring 
legitimacy through the Western Model.  
                                                          
35 Diallo, Amadou, and Denis Thuillier. "The Success Dimensions of International 
Development Projects: The Perceptions of African Project Coordinators." <i>International 
Journal of Project Management</i> 22, no. 1 (2003): 19-31. 
36 Conflict and Fragility the State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations : Unpacking 
Complexity. Paris: OECD, 2010. 
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Max Weber, a German political economist, describes three types of 
authority. The first is the “legal” method, which occurs when institutional 
norms generate the leader and regime of a nation. Norms are crafted by 
the legal institutions, and legitimacy is derived from legal-rational norms. 
The second is the “traditional” method, in which customary norms 
generate the leader and legitimacy rests upon traditional customs. The 
third is the “charismatic” method, which, unlike the legal and traditional 
methods, is not bound by any social norms. This method creates new 
norms based on the attitudes of the leader, from which legitimacy is 
derived.37 For the two case studies in this paper, both countries have a 
democracy governing the state; therefore, they gain their legitimacy 
through a mix of legal and charismatic methods, having citizens vote 
(legal) on which leader appeals to them the most (charismatic). 
The goal of this study is to analyze different economic infrastructure 
development projects in a security context. Most military field manuals 
identify what needs to be carried out to stabilize an area, where most 
literature analyzes infrastructure development projects in the context of 
improving standards of living. There is a gap in the information military 
field manuals provides for stability operations and real world examples. 
This writing intends to fill the void by discussing specific examples that 
are analyzed in the literature in the context of military doctrine.  
                                                          
37 Spencer, Martin. "Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority." The British Journal of 





USAID and DoD both have investigative bodies that are led by an 
inspector general who reviews his/her respective organizations as a 
whole to look for waste and illicit activities. These investigations include 
development operations and are delegated to areas of operations. For 
example, DoD has an inspector general for the entire department and 
another for Afghan reconstruction. I will use the reports from the 
Inspector Generals of USAID and DoD to research the outcome of 
development projects abroad, thereby allowing me to assess the 
shortcomings of the US government and their effect on stability 
operations as a whole. I will also use academic literature to reinforce and 
expand upon the problems that were identified in the government 
reports. I will then relate these shortcomings to military doctrine and the 
effect these inadequacies have on the goals of stability and 
counterinsurgency operations.  
The research will focus on Afghanistan and Iraq since each is categorized 
as an underdeveloped country by the UN and has recently experienced 
events causing massive instability due to military action and insurgency. 
In addition, these two selected countries provided the most information 
on development projects that fit the criteria for inclusion in my research. 
Afghanistan has a history that is ravaged by war. The United States 
invaded in 2001 to topple the Taliban regime and defeat Al-Qaeda. It is 
19 
 
now one of the largest recipients of US development projects, receiving 
funding from both DoD and the Department of State. Iraq has a history 
of dictatorship and constant conflict with neighboring countries. It was 
invaded by a US led coalition and experienced sectarian violence that 
evolved into a civil war.  
Hypothesis 
I predict that economic infrastructure development projects create 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the insurgency and negatively 
affect the mission of the US. These vulnerabilities are caused by the host 
nation, the local social environment, and the US Government.  
Results 
 
The relationship between capacity of the host nation government and the 
sustainability of the economic development project in the planning phase 
of development is outlined in chapter one. Andrew Natsios, in his article, 
The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development, refers to capacity 
as the “ability to retain, absorb, and facilitate economic investment, 
whether from donor assistance or from private sources of foreign direct 
investment (FDI).” 38 If capacity is not considered in the planning stages 
of the project, then the project is unlikely to be sustained due to the lack 
                                                          
38 Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." Strategic 
Studies Institute. January 1, 2005. Accessed October 4, 2014.  
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of available resources to maintain economic infrastructure development 
projects.39  
Chapter two identifies oversight as a variable that affects the outcome of 
an economic infrastructure development project during the execution 
phase. Oversight refers to the monitoring by the US government of the 
development project through its duration to ensure a successful 
outcome. Oversight takes into account all factors of the project’s 
execution and can be flexible or rigid depending upon the type of project. 
When a project has a lack of oversight, it is more likely to end in failure 
due to factors such as lack of impact on the surrounding community, the 
project not being built to quality, or not abiding by the original plans . 
Proper oversight is necessary for a project to be successful. In this 
writing, success is defined by the completion of a development project 
that is sustainable without the assistance of an outside nation, is built 
on time and on budget, and has a beneficial effect on the surrounding 
community. 
Chapter three focuses on the accountability of companies and 
development agencies that are contracted by the US to implement 
economic development projects. Accountability refers to holding the 
contractor responsible for its actions and failures of the project. This 
usually happens after the project has been completed, or, if the situation 
is bad enough, when the project is halted due to deficiencies. If the 




contractor does not follow the original plan, that contractor may be 
punished either financially or with the unavailability of future contracts 
from the US government. If contractors have little incentive to abide by 
the contracts, they are less likely to follow through with the original plan, 
the results of which may include sub-standard construction, budget 
overruns, and delays. If these flaws in accountability are reoccurring, it 
could pose a problem in the ongoing inefficiencies of subcontractors who 
believe they can take advantage of US development funds.  
The goal of chapter four is to determine what effect project failure has on 
meeting stability operations objectives. A review of the literature revealed 
that failure of development projects can fuel negative perception of the 
US and host nation governments. This negative perception can be 
contagious among the local population, affecting the legitimacy of the 
host nation government. This, in turn, can change the behavior of the 
population in two ways. First, the local population may use less public 
services, such as schools and roadways. Second, the insurgency often 
gains support and legitimacy, using the project failure as a recruiting 




Chapter 1: Host Nation Capacity 
 
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once stated, “the capabilities 
of the United States’ allies and partners may be as important as its own, 
and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so 
than, the fighting the United States does itself.”40  Primary goals for all 
international development projects are sustainability once assistance is 
no longer available and acceptance of responsibility for the project by the 
host nation government. Unfortunately, most countries where 
development projects are implemented have weak governments, with 
feeble policies, that often lack the ability to lead their own economic and 
social development.  Even the most well designed project has the 
potential to fail due to the poor institutional environment. Consequently, 
it is very important to take into consideration the capacity of the host 
nation government in the planning and execution stages of a project. 
Since infrastructure plays an important role in stability operations, 
weaknesses may create vulnerabilities that put counterinsurgency 
missions at risk. A major vulnerability arises when the host nation 
government does not have the capacity to keep up with increased 
demand for public services while sustaining economic infrastructure 
development. 
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After the US led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, much of the scarce 
yet critical infrastructure was destroyed by the initial invasion. In Iraq’s 
case, much was damaged by post invasion looting. When developing 
infrastructure, one factor that is often not taken into account is the effect 
displaced populations would have on urban areas, the primary places to 
which people flock in times of conflict. Displaced civilians are likely to 
turn to cities to take advantage of the increased security provided by the 
public and the military, which is often stationed there to protect the 
already high concentration of population.41 This influx of people puts a 
strain on the already fragile infrastructure, limiting the amount of 
residents it can service and limiting access to such things as water and 
sanitation.   
The other cause for an increase in the demand for public goods is the 
pace at which the economy develops. If the pace at which infrastructure 
is developing cannot keep up with the speed at which the economy is 
growing, the infrastructure can be strained to the point that it constricts 
economic progress.42 An example is the electricity availability in Iraq. 
Iraq has often been plagued with gaps in the provision of electricity 
despite its great energy resources, due to the local population paying 
artificially low prices for electricity, creating no incentive for consumers 
to use less electricity. As a result of increased economic activity, more 
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and more Iraqis were buying electrical appliances, such as air 
conditioners. The greater the amount of electrical products in a 
household and increased use put greater the strain on the electrical grid, 
causing gaps in the availability of electricity.43 As of 2010, Iraq was 
generating twice the amount of electricity it had before the invasion but 
was still experiencing limitations due to this increased consumption.44 
Any movements to increase the price have been met with resistance from 
society for fear that economic growth will be stunted and runs risk of 
slowing down the growth in the economy.45 This consumption is 
projected to increase 6.5 percent every year on average.46 With no 
foreseeable change to price or capacity, Iraqi citizens will continue to 
experience energy shortages despite its resources.  
Similarly, in Afghanistan, a rapid increase in the use of electricity per 
household occurred as it became more readily available. The already 
weak infrastructure was unable to keep up with the consumption of the 
Afghan households, commercial businesses, and industry. Consumption 
skyrocketed, as evidenced by the increase in connections from 
approximately 75,000 in 2009 to approximately 1.05 million in 2013.47 
Despite the efforts by the US and Afghan government, the development of 
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the electrical infrastructure were not able to keep pace with usage of 
electricity. The Ministry of Energy and Water admitted that they 
underestimated the future demand for electricity and built an 
infrastructure with lower capacity than was ultimately needed to handle 
the increased use. For example, 220 kilovolt power lines were used 
instead of 500 kilovolt lines that would have allowed longer distance to 
be covered when transferring electricity to different regions.48  
Restoring essential services is one of the most important initiatives to 
reinforcing the legitimacy of the host nation government.49 The problem 
that often occurs with aid and development organizations is that they 
often want to show something tangible so that success is easily 
measured rather than emphasizing the project’s effect on the 
population.50  These projects, although initially very successful, are 
either built in areas in which they are not effective or do not have 
methods in place to sustain the project, providing things such as regular 
maintenance or funding.  
This inability to provide services to the population creates expectation 
gaps within the population. An expectation gap is when the population 
expects the host nation government to provide public goods that it has 
promised but is unable to deliver. It is a double edged sword. On one 
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side, the host nation’s legitimacy is weakened due to the appearance of 
being unable to provide for its own people, on the other side, it creates an 
opportunity for the insurgency to fill these gaps and gain legitimacy 
among the population, enhancing their influence. 
When implementing an economic infrastructure development project, 
sustainability is often overlooked. A project, once completed, could have 
immediate positive effects on the surrounding area; however, if there 
aren’t systems in place to maintain, staff, and finance the project once 
US forces leave the area, the benefits the project has on the local 
population will not last. The US government has often invested in 
economic infrastructure development while conducting stability 
operations but did not consider the sustainability of the project; turning 
it over to the host nation government who fails to maintain the project in 
the end.  
Due to the nature of stability operations, host nation security is included 
as a factor in economic development. Security is essential in maintaining 
a safe and stable environment. It lays the foundation for development 
projects, especially in places with an active insurgency such as Iraq or 
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, with the pullout of the majority of US 
forces, many forward operating bases (FOBs) are vital for the Afghan 
government to govern remote parts of its territory. Many of these FOBs, 
when handed over to the Afghan National Army, have fallen into 
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disrepair, with some projects that were established inside the bases 
becoming unsustainable once the US forces pulled out.  
At FOB Salerno in Khowst Province, Afghanistan, due to a lack of 
sanitation infrastructure, incinerators were needed to remove waste that 
accumulated over time. The USACE awarded a $5.4 million contract to 
have the incinerators constructed. The contract included the 
development of two 8 ton capacity incinerators, which were constructed 
according to plan, properly sized for the base’s daily solid waste and 
could operate 24 hours a day.51 However, what was not considered was 
the $1 million annual cost to operate the incinerator. This combined with 
its limited use led officials at FOB Salerno not to use the facilities. Due to 
lack of maintenance the incinerators eventually fell into disrepair.52 
Though this one project does not seem like a big loss, it hurts the image 
of the host nation government, making it appear as if they are not able to 
provide for their security forces. It also could have negative implications 
on the morale of the military personnel stationed there, making them 
less effective and giving the insurgency the upper hand in the area.    
The USACE has been working on building partner capacity to improve a 
nation’s self-reliance for decades. Self-reliance results in people’s lives 
being improved, the host nation’s reliance on external aid being reduced, 
and long term success being more likely, which ultimately leads to a 
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better return on investment for the United States.53  Development 
projects must be selected with consideration of the availability of local 
financial, human, and material resources during the construction of the 
project and its operation.54 This ensures that the project will be built in a 
timely, cost effective manner and will continue to benefit society once aid 
is pulled. Also, attention must be given to the education and skill level of 
the local population. There is often a knowledge gap between the donors 
and the recipients of the project.55 Even with a quality built project, for 
which the host nation has allocated sufficient funds and manpower, if 
there is a lack of knowledge on how to operate and maintain it, the 
sustainability is affected. Authors Do Ba Khang and Tun Lin Moe, in 
their article Success Criteria and Factors for International Development 
Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based Framework, found that the “sustainability of 
project results has a larger bearing on the perceived success judgment 
than other success criteria.”56 In other words, sustainability is the largest 
factor in considering the success of a project.  
Many US government projects have included consideration of current 
capacity and capacity improvement when implementing projects. The 
USACE Gulf Region District in Iraq set out to improve the human 
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capacity of workers at public facilities. The Corps established training 
programs for city workers to maintain the water services, sewage 
systems, and transportation infrastructure, thereby enabling them to 
maintain projects once the US pulled out and increasing the 
sustainability of each project.57 USACE assisted in modernizing Al Anbar 
University’s Engineering College which can now provide on-the-job 
training for students, giving them a better understanding of how to 
improve their own infrastructure.58 USACE also constructed a training 
facility for Iraqi corrections officers to better operate Iraqi prisons, 
keeping them current with medical and rehabilitation services that will 
assist in implementing Iraqi rule of law.59 
In Afghanistan, similar steps were taken to improve the capacity of the 
government. USAID considers Afghanistan’s education institutions as 
“building blocks” that will maintain current US technical projects.60 
USAID has been supporting Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education through 
the University Support and Workforce Development Program by 
providing technical and management advisors, assisting with their 
curriculums, and advising on textbook printing.61 62 This assistance is 
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needed due to the increase in public university attendance from 7,800 
students in 2001 to 123,000 in 2013. USAID also supported the 
Information Technology associates degree at Kabul Polytechnic 
University, which links students to a growing IT industry in Afghanistan. 
63 This assistance will culminate in current projects being sustained, by 
having the subject matter expertise in place to maintain them, and by 
enabling Afghans to start development projects on their own.   
Although the aforementioned example showcases an instance in which 
there is initiative being taken to educate the population to sustain the 
economy and economic infrastructure development projects, there are 
many other examples of projects that have failed because capacity was 
not considered in the planning stages of a project. The Sheberghan 
School in Jowzjan Province, Afghanistan, was a project funded by USAID 
and USACE in May 2008, to educate Afghan youth. A SIGAR quarterly 
report found that the building was being used for its intended function, 
but it was still not completed four years after the start of construction. 
The investigation found that there was no heat, running water, or 
electricity for the building. There was a generator, but it was not 
working. Even if the generator was working, the staff said that they 
would need the US government to subsidize the $50,000 monthly fuel 
costs. The Afghan government refused to pay these costs because 




ownership of the school had not yet been transferred to them.64 The 
school was unsustainable by both the local population and the host 
nation government. Even though the building was being used for 
education, its efficiency was severely limited since teachers and students 
lacked access to basic necessities required to operate. 
Energy is an important factor that leads to successful industry within a 
country. It also leads to better quality of life for the population, providing 
things such as air conditioning and refrigeration. The Kajaki Dam serves 
as an example of a project that was able to be sustained despite going 
through transitions in power and lack of finances. The dam was built in 
1953 with assistance from the US Export Import Bank. It was eventually 
upgraded in 1975 with USAID assistance to provide increased power to 
the region. USAID withdrew their aid once the Soviet Union invaded, 
cutting off a vital financial pipeline to the project. Despite the dam’s 
original source of financing being dried up, the dam continued to 
operate, providing continuous electricity and irrigation in the Helmand 
and Kandahar provinces through the Soviet occupation, the civil war, 
and during the Taliban rule. This success can be attributed to the 
extensive engineering training that was provided early on as well as the 
willingness of the local Afghan population to keep the dam operational.65 
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The project had addressed important issues regarding sustainability, 
such as keeping the local population educated about the technical aspect 
of maintaining the dam and having the Afghans take responsibility for 
their own project.  
Although the Kajaki Dam was sustainable, the energy sector in 
Afghanistan in general has proven to be unsustainable without the help 
of the US government. Kandahar province had one of the largest 
electrical development projects in Afghanistan; however, the private 
electric power companies lacked the capacity to maintain a profitable 
business. The Afghan government has relied on these private companies 
to maintain their electrical grid network, carrying out functions such as 
repairs and revenue collection. The Afghan power utility in Kandahar, Da 
Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), had a limited capacity to collect 
revenue through billing, which hinders its ability to maintain its own 
infrastructure, even to the extent that it could not refuel its own 
generators.66 As a result, the DABS is highly dependent on the US and 
Afghan government to subsidize its shortcomings. 
To reduce power shortages, the United States government increased 
power availability in Kandahar City by 25-27 megawatts (MW), resulting 
in a 61 percent increase in energy use. Since the Afghan government 
does not have the financial wherewithal to maintain the energy sector in 
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Kandahar, the US government still supplies the funding and diesel fuel. 
If this support were to be stopped before more sustainable solutions are 
found, electric usage would drop to 12 MW.67 68 One sustainable solution 
to the power problem was the building of a hydroelectric dam. Once 
completed however, the project is expected to provide less power than the 
current diesel generators maintained by the US.69  Without a steady 
supply of electricity, businesses are unable to be successful, leading to 
unemployment among the local population. Insurgencies are able to take 
advantage of the high unemployment rate by paying locals to carry out 
duties for them such as planting improvised explosive devices or 
gathering intelligence.   
Host nation capacity is the most important factor to consider while 
implementing a development project. If the host nation government is not 
providing to the local populations the public goods they are expecting, 
the opportunity arises for insurgent groups to step in and fill that gap, 
garnering more legitimacy while eroding the legitimacy of both the host 
nation government and US forces. The US has a mixed record with 
development project sustainability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although 
numerous projects were not sustainable, there has been significant 
investment made to increase the capacity of the host nation government 
through education. Ensuring that a country has the human capital to 
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maintain development projects is important in sustaining development 





Chapter 2: Oversight 
 
Upon completion of the planning 
phase, during which the host 
nation capacity is the most 
important consideration, the 
project moves to the execution 
phase. During this phase, 
oversight plays a primary role in 
determining the success of project 
construction. Throughout the literature discussing the shortcomings of 
infrastructure development projects, a recurring issue that arises is the 
failure of either the contractor or the aid agency to properly oversee the 
implementation of the development project. Oversight is necessary to 
ensure quality construction in the allotted time and within the allocated 
budget. Oversight is also necessary for fast problem identification and 
quick problem resolution. The sooner the problem is identified, the 
quicker it can be resolved and the lesser the effect it will have on the 
outcome of the project. There are three types of oversight discussed in 
this paper: (1) aid agency oversight, whereby aid agencies oversee the 
contracting agencies they hire to complete a project; (2) contractor 
oversight, in which contracting agencies oversee their employees and 
subcontractors; and (3) project management oversight whereby project 
teams directly oversee the implementation of the project.  
Figure 2 Breakdown of Oversight 
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Security is an important aspect both in making the environment stable 
for the development of an economy and in reinforcing the legitimacy of 
the host nation government. It is important that a government has an 
efficient and effective military force to combat threats. In Afghanistan, at 
FOB Sharana, located in the Paktika Province, the USACE determined 
that an incinerator was needed to deal with the garbage accumulation. 
They awarded a contract worth $5.6 million to construct a solid waste 
management facility.70 The project was officially completed in December 
2012, but was not operational during a site survey that was conducted in 
May 2013. The delays in operation were due to electrical deficiencies that 
limited operability which led to limitations in operability. The USACE, as 
the contract overseer, had the responsibility to inspect and test the 
electrical systems of the FOB, but the inspection and testing were never 
completed.71 If the inspection had occurred during the last stages of 
project implementation, the problems would have been found and 
corrected.   
Another FOB, Camp Zafar, which is located outside of Herat, experienced 
similar problems to the projects at Camp Shaheen. Projects were delayed 
due to poor contractor performance relating to cost and schedule 
management. The result was a cost overrun of $1.68 million. The Special 
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Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) found that the Air 
Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) contracting officer failed to provide 
adequate oversight of the contractor at the base in Herat.72 The 
responsibility of the contracting officer is to monitor contractor 
performance and hold contractors accountable for their actions.  Despite 
concerns about contractor performance, the AFCEC contracting officer 
approved $5 million in funding increases for the project at Camp Zafar 
and failed to follow up on previous requests for the contracting company 
to institute corrective actions.73 Due to this lack of oversight, the project 
was poorly managed financially.  
Lack of oversight was also evident during the development of 
Afghanistan’s education system, which is necessary for preparing the 
population for technical jobs that are created by development projects. 
The Bathkhak School project in Kabul, Afghanistan was awarded to the 
Emaar Emarat Construction Company by US Forces-Afghanistan 
(USFORA) for $260,000 to build a ten classroom addition to an existing 
school.74 The project ended with the school addition being unsustainable 
for a variety of reasons. The contractor failed to follow the original plans 
delineated in the contract. The Emaar Emarat Construction Company 
built two small buildings rather than the one addition that was planned. 
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They used brick rather than concrete blocks for the walls and wood 
rather than vinyl-framed windows, and they installed a concrete-slab roof 
instead of the required wood-truss for the roof. Since the school was 
located in an earthquake prone zone and due to the type of construction, 
there was a heightened risk for collapse. Inspectors stated it was a 
“disaster waiting to happen.”75 This school had the potential to educate 
an entire region and keep children away from the influence of the 
insurgency, but due to the lack of oversight by USFORA, the school 
remained unusable, having a detrimental effect on the education access 
for people in that area. If better oversight was performed, the problems 
that stemmed from the site location and building materials could have 
been avoided, resulting in a higher likelihood of success for the project.   
In Iraq, lack of oversight resulted in the failure to curb overcharging on 
specific contracts; thereby leaving the US government to foot the bill. A 
report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 
found that the subcontractor Anham, which was responsible for $3.9 
billion worth of contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, was significantly 
overcharging the US government for supplies. Overcharges included 
$900 for a control switch that costs around $7, $3,000 for a circuit 
breaker that costs around $95, and $4,500 for another circuit breaker 
that was valued at $180. The failure of the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) to review the estimating system used by Anham provided 




the opportunity for overcharging, of which Anham took full advantage. 76 
Although this lack of oversight did not have an effect on the completion 
and operation of the projects, the funds that were unnecessarily paid out 
could have been used to finance other development projects or even 
enhanced security around existing projects.  
The Rusafa Political District in Iraq provides additional examples of the 
impact of the lack of oversight on the success of a project. In that city, 
the US Army, the USACE, and the USAID conducted various projects in 
the areas of education, electricity and security.77 Many personnel 
operating in the area believed that the money that was spent on schools 
could have been better used on projects that had more of an immediate 
impact. In addition to problems staffing the schools, the quality of the 
work done for the education projects was so low that some projects were 
rejected by the Ministry of Education.78 There was also limited 
coordination between the three US government agencies working in the 
area of operation. Lack of oversight and coordination resulted in the 
ineffectiveness of the school projects. Better coordination among the US 
agencies working in the area and more stringent requirements in 
selecting contracting agencies could have produced better results.  
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In situations where oversight was conducted properly, the projects 
experienced significantly better coordination, communication, and 
implementation, which usually resulted in success. One aspect of 
effective oversight is the requirement that project planners and 
contractors customize each project so that it fits the local environment. If 
the local culture is not addressed in the design of the project, the 
sustainability of the project could be jeopardized. If the local population 
rejects the project, maintaining it would be much more difficult. It is 
important that the local community sense ownership of the project. This 
goal can be achieved by integrating the needs of the community with the 
project.79  Andrew Natsios, who served as administrator of the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and was a US Special Envoy to 
Sudan, argues that a “country must drive its own development needs.”80 
To enhance ownership, people need to understand that the project is 
there to meet the needs of their community and not drive the agenda of 
the donor nation. They also need to take an active role in the 
implementation of the project, making the community feel that they had 
a hand in the project. Different initiatives must meet the country’s needs 
in order to build credibility, trust, and consensus among the local 
population, which, in turn, will lead the community to “defend, maintain, 
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and expand” the project, thereby sustaining it once the donor country 
leaves.81  
An example of incorporating the local community in project 
implementation is USAID’s work with media programs and radio 
broadcasters in Afghanistan. Radio is an important commodity in 
Afghanistan, where the majority of the population cannot read and are 
located in areas that are hard to reach. To improve the flow of 
information, USAID provided capital to 32 radio stations in a project 
called the Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project 
(AMDEP).82 Instead of operating the stations themselves, they reached 
out to the local Afghan community to find strong local partners to 
execute their programing. Additionally, instead of targeting a broad base 
of the Afghan population, they targeted 15 – 40 year olds, the age group 
that would have the largest impact on the future of Afghanistan.83 The 
information they wanted to send was often on the progress of 
reconstruction in their country as well as the new democratic political 
process.84 They also trained local Afghans in journalism and created a 
“Diploma in Media” at the Nai Media Institute. Integrating local Afghans 
into the project and training them so they could be proficient in their 
tasks. The result was a sustainable project that was tailored to a specific 
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population. The success of the project opened the lines of proficient 
communication between the government and hard to reach populations, 
and expanded access to information regarding development projects 
occurring in the region.   
In Iraq, Mercy Corps was given a contract to complete a variety of 
projects under the direction of Community Action Groups (CAGs). These 
900 projects included small infrastructure improvements that focused on 
water, sanitation, electricity, and transportation as well as the 
construction of bridges and schools. Mercy Corps focused on the 
inclusion of local residents to represent their needs and adapted each 
project to the community where they were being constructed. Not only 
did these projects end in success, but they also increased trust between 
communities and the local government by increasing communication, 
allowing Mercy Corps to identify the development needs of the local 
population more efficiently.85  
Oversight in the construction of an economic infrastructure development 
project is essential to making sure that the project is carried out in an 
efficient manner and has a positive effect on the local population. If 
oversight is lacking, the project runs the risk of going over budget, 
experiencing delays, or not producing the intended results. With the 
failure of economic infrastructure development projects, either during the 
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construction phase or in the aftermath, the host nation government as 
well as US forces seem to be disconnected from the needs of the local 
population. When a government is insensitive to the interests of the 
population, legitimacy of authority is questioned, potentially hindering 
counterinsurgency efforts by US forces. Thus, effective oversight in the 
implementation of development projects is necessary to ensure that the 
projects are executed in a manner that fosters success and strengthens 
the mission of the US in stability operations.   
Project Management 
 
Aid agency oversight and contractor oversight are generally large-scale 
forms of oversight. Project management, on the other hand, is a form of 
oversight that is more directly involved in the implementation of a 
specific project. Proper project management is crucial for the success of 
development projects, preventing wrongdoing at the organizational level. 
Successful project management occurs when a development project is 
completed within the allotted time and within the established parameters 
while ensuring quality and staying within the appropriated budget.86 It is 
important to note that successful project management does not always 
result in success. There are many outside variables that can affect the 
outcome of a project itself; however, in construction projects, effective 
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project management and success are closely related.87 Project planners 
on occasion have trouble finding a solution to problems encountered in 
project implementation. Failing to formulate, prepare, and execute 
development projects will impede the infusion of much needed capital 
into underdeveloped countries.88  
The oversight of a development project is a wide ranging function that is 
necessary in the planning and implementation phases. Most often, 
members of higher level leadership in an agency or organization are not 
involved in the day-to-day activities of a project; they usually are updated 
at the completion of each phase of a project. The two lowest levels of 
project planning and implementation are the project coordinator and the 
task manager. The coordinator has to ask the task manager for approval 
on large transactions, which the task manager may reject if the 
transactions do not fit into the original plan. The task manager also is 
responsible for ensuring that the project is adhering to the established 
guidelines of the original project.89 For this oversight process to work, 
communication is essential, and for effective communication to occur 
there needs to be trust between the two actors.90 This idea can also be 
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applied to government oversight of its contractors. If there is reciprocal 
trust between the US government and its contractors, project 
development becomes more efficient and the quality of the project is 
improved, adding to its sustainability. 
There are often common faults found within project management. 
Lavagnon A. Ika, professor of Project Management at the Telfer School of 
Management at the University of Ottawa, identified three common 
problems that are experienced when carrying out a development project. 
These problems include the “one size fits all” trap, the “managing for 
results” dilemma, and the lack of capacity of project managers. The “One 
Size Fits All” problem occurs when a project is planned with a 
preconceived set of objectives and methods to obtain certain goals. 
Having the same objectives and methods for all projects prevents each 
individual project from being tailored to the environment, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. This not only makes the project less likely to be 
accepted by the local population but does not address other factors such 
as security or environment when implementing the project.91  
The “Managing for Results” dilemma arises when data, collected for the 
purpose of improving the performance of a team or their project, is not 
relayed back to the team but instead is given to outside stakeholders.92 
The team has no way of knowing what problems exist and therefore 





cannot attempt to fix the issues. The only individuals who get the 
information have no immediate effect on the project. Without the 
information, the team is prevented from choosing a different course of 
action.  
The lack of capacity of project managers means that development 
projects do not have enough trained personnel to be implemented well.93 
Even with sufficient resources being devoted to a development project, 
the lack of trained personnel to perform the necessary tasks can cause 
serious problems, such as exceeding the time allotted, surpassing the 
agreed upon funding, and failing to provide adequate oversight. 
Keeping within the proposed time frame is an important aspect of project 
implementation and can have a direct effect on the budget in that the 
longer it takes to build, the more expensive the project will be. It is 
important for project managers to keep the project on time by providing 
adequate oversight, which is achieved through a project cycle that 
includes project identification, preparation, appraisal, implementation, 
and evaluation.94 If these steps are clearly defined in the planning phase, 
it is more likely that the project will finish on time and be built to quality. 
The evaluation is most important, for it determines whether the approach 
to the project was effective or not, and can be used to ensure 
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accountability.  Some of the primary causes for delay involve lengthy 
contract negotiations, procurement postponement, drawn-out land 
acquisition transactions, and consultant recruitment delay.95  
Keeping within budget is another important aspect of project 
management. Budgeting is used for planning, monitoring, and for 
controlling the money that goes into a project as well as providing a 
foundation for accountability, since most errors involve finances. As 
mentioned before, staying within the allocated budget is directly related 
to the timeliness of project completion; projects that take longer than the 
allocated time cost more than the allotted budget.96 In the planning 
phase, it is important to develop a budget that incorporates every aspect 
of the project, and designates certain funds for any unforeseen expenses 
that may arise. Flexibility in the budget is a necessity in development 
projects due to the unstable environment in which they are constructed.   
The scope or design of the project is the plan of execution and includes 
the goals, phases, time frame, budget, target audience, and any other 
aspect necessary for the development of a successful project.  One study, 
the “Critical Success Factors for World Bank Projects,” conducted by the 
University of Quebec, surveyed World Bank project supervisors regarding 
the most important factor in project success. The consensus was that 
design constitutes the most critical component for success.  More 





specifically, design needs to address the long term effects and the 
sustainability of a project.97 
Team cohesion is also important in project development, when team 
members work together the efficiency of project implementation 
increases. In a project team, there are different roles and responsibilities.  
The task manager is located in the headquarters of the development 
agency and supervises project implementation. The national project 
coordinator in a project team is the person in charge of the daily 
activities and leads the team.98 The project team is responsible for all of 
the inputs that are needed to complete a project including the 
supervision of engineering firms, consultants, and subcontractors, as 
well as overseeing procurement and organization.99 All of these levels of 
control need cohesion in order to successfully complete a development 
project. It is important to note that these exact position titles might not 
be used in every project, but every project has positions that handle 
these responsibilities.  
The Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) goals in Afghanistan are 
to “improve food security and nutrition” as well as to “promote 
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sustainable agriculture” and to “build capacity in the agricultural sector 
at the national and local levels.” 100 These goals are especially important 
in Afghanistan, since agriculture represents over half of its gross 
domestic product (GDP).101 The FAO sought to improve agriculture in 
Afghanistan through various projects addressing irrigation. One of these 
projects was the Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP), 
which was started in June 2004, and implemented by the Ministry of 
Energy and Water (MEW) with the support of FAO. This project sought to 
improve irrigation water for farmers to increase agricultural productivity. 
The outcome of the EIRP was a success, exceeding the target goal of 
rehabilitation of agricultural land.102 Not only did it reduce rural poverty 
and increase land value, it also reduced conflicts over water and 
promoted cohesion in the community. Effective cohesion between the 
project team and the local populace allowed for efficient maintenance of 
the irrigation canal. The FAO staff included the local population in the 
implementation of the project and trained them to maintain the canal so 
that it would be sustained once FAO left the area.103  
The study conducted by the University of Quebec mentioned previously 
also assessed the impact of trust and communication on the success of 
development projects. Based on questionnaires completed by project 
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coordinators of development projects, the data indicated that trust is the 
dominant factor that improves team cohesion and improves 
communication between coordinators and task managers.104 The study 
also found that intervention of a higher authority into a lower authority’s 
work may result in a power struggle and often leads to project failure.105 
Different levels of oversight are essential to carry out development 
projects. Oversight on the US agency level and developmental 
organization level have different implications compared to the project 
management level. Though it is important to have oversight at higher 
levels to keep within the given budget and time table, oversight at the 
project management level has the strongest influence on the outcome of 
a project. Project level oversight facilitates adaption of the project to the 
local environment and resolution of any problems that arise, improving 
the chances of implementing a successful project. Economic 
infrastructure development projects, if handled correctly, enhance the 
local community’s sense of ownership, increase community involvement, 
and promote sustainability.  
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Chapter 3: Accountability 
 
Upon completion of the execution phase of an economic development 
project, the post-completion phase begins. Accountability is the 
cornerstone of this phase. Accountability ensures that the project was 
built to standard and that there was no improper conduct by the 
contracting company or development agency during the execution phase. 
Proper oversight ensures project deficiencies are recognized and resolved; 
accountability ensures that deficiencies within the contractor’s execution 
of a project are not repeated. Through the taking of accountability 
measures, the donor nation can minimize the opportunities for 
exploitation of their generosity and money from the contracting company. 
With regard to many failed development projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
many of the contractors were not held accountable for their actions. 
Contractors need to have incentive and consequences to ensure 
completion of the development project as specified in the contract. This 
penance can be in the form of fines, cancellation of contracts, or the 
banning of the contractor from future contracts. A lack of financial 
accountability was the most common deficiency in failed development 
projects aside from oversight. Contractors were constructing poor quality 
projects or did not construct the project according to plan, but were paid 
in full nonetheless.  
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In a country with high levels of corruption, it is important to make sure 
that the money is being spent on project necessities and not being 
pocketed by government officials or contracting personnel. The strength 
of a host nation’s rule of law is at stake. If contractors are able to get 
away with breaking the law and profit therefrom, more contracting 
companies will break the law. In addition, it is important to make sure 
that contractors do not sacrifice quality, such as buying cheaper building 
supplies, to provide greater profits, thereby jeopardizing the performance 
and safety of the project.  
For the failed incinerator project at FOB Sharana, the contract indicated 
that the capacity of the waste management system needed to be 24 tons 
of waste per day, but the contractor instead installed two 40 ton 
incinerators.106 Due to the size of the two incinerators, there was little 
space available for motorized equipment to move around the incinerator, 
forcing the personnel there to have to load the incinerator manually. This 
manual loading decreased the operational ability down to 80 percent.107 
In October 2013, the base was transferred to the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) who allegedly had the incinerators deconstructed. Due to the 
contractor not following the original plans, the project could not serve its 
intended purpose. Despite the fact that the contractor failed to follow the 
original plans, complete the project on time, and properly construct the 
                                                          




waste management system, the contractor was paid in full.108 USACE did 
not hold the contractor accountable for the flaws in the work, costing 
more in the long run in repairs and eventually resulting in the 
incinerators being scrapped altogether. 
The contract for the Sheberghan School in Jowzjan Province, 
Afghanistan, was awarded to the Iraqi firm, Mercury Development. They 
were to construct a two story, 10 classroom building that included a 
library and an administrative office. The project experienced construction 
delays and cost increases that surged the total price to $3.4 million.109 
The USACE knew of the performance issues with the contractor and sent 
62 letters to Mercury Development voicing concerns over the project. 
However, even though the USACE knew of the deficiencies, they marked 
the contract as complete, releasing Mercury Development from any 
further legal responsibility.110 The USACE then contracted the 
Zafarkhaliq Construction Company for $153,000 to complete the work 
left undone by Mercury Development in the time frame of 30 days. Eight 
months later, the work was still not completed. The USACE terminated 
the contract but had already paid Zafarkhaliq $130,000, only $23,000 
short of the original value of the contract.111 Again, the contractor was 
nearly paid in full despite not meeting the established deadlines or 
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completing the project. Consequently, such lack of accountability 
provides no incentive to fulfill contractual obligations.  
In Iraq, a series of workshops to identify areas where improvement was 
needed to reach the various Millennium Development goals were 
organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 
partnership with the Ministry of Planning for Iraq and Kurdistan. The 
participants found that accountability through transparency was the 
most important issue that Iraq needed to improve.112 One area that 
needed improvement was the education sector; educators were not 
required to meet expectations outlined by the Iraqi government, resulting 
in lower performance. The UNDP report stated that schools have 
“outdated teaching methods, inadequate and unsafe infrastructure, lack 
of capacity to serve special needs, or lack of servers to provide nutritious 
meals to children in need.”113  The Iraqi government did have standards 
for education, but enforcement of these standards was lacking. Parents 
did not have communication avenues to complain about the dire 
situation in the school systems, and thus become discouraged from 
keeping their children in school. The lack of accountability instills 
mistrust in the education institutions and erodes development efforts to 
increase the effectiveness of education institutions, making the 
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government look ineffective in providing important public goods such as 
education.  
In the Rusafa Political District, there were also accountability issues 
when selecting contractors to implement development projects intended 
to stabilize the area. When the US was awarding projects, there were few 
procedures in place to keep track of the contractors that were hired.114 In 
the beginning of the reconstruction effort, the US was awarding contracts 
to anyone who would accept them, without any background checks on 
the companies. This lax method of selecting contractors led to 
widespread corruption, and interfered with the mission of the US 
agencies. There was also a lack of transparency when the reconstruction 
effort first began that made it difficult for the US to identify potential 
problems with specific contractors and to detect the areas where 
corruption was occurring.115  
The United States has various systems in place to ensure accountability 
and to protect its funds from misuse. These systems are based upon the 
Federal Acquisition Rules, which sets guidelines for agencies’ tracking of 
acquisitions, including both products and labor.116 In continuance of 
these rules, USAID has limited the number of primary contracts for 
development in Afghanistan. They have contracted with major 
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international development firms, which then subcontract to Afghan 
construction firms. This practice allows the US government to 
consolidate their oversight to fewer organizations and to enforce 
accountability more efficiently.117 They have also supported the Afghan 
Ministry of Finance in starting anti-corruption programs to battle 
corruption in government.  
Executing economic development projects in Iraq and Afghanistan 
requires a lot of moving parts and a massive amount of cash exchanging 
hands. To account for this cash, the US government created two 
agencies, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 
and the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). 
These two agencies review development projects, their effect on the 
surrounding environment, and any mishandling of funds. They conduct 
these assessments through investigations, audits, and thorough 
interviews by a staff that works on the ground in theatre. They have 
prosecuted military and civilian personnel for bribery and overcharging, 
and have provided recommendations to both the State Department and 
the Defense Department on how to improve development projects. These 
agencies, which report to Congress, provide accountability, saving the US 
government millions of dollars and ensuring that a quality project is 
produced.  




USAID has not had the best track record of holding small contracting 
firms accountable for their actions on projects, but has had success in 
investigating major development firms that did not fulfill their 
contractual obligations. One of these companies was the Academy of 
Educational Development (AED). AED managed nearly $500 million 
worth of development projects annually, employing 2,700 people, making 
them one of the larger development organizations.118 In 2009, the USAID 
Inspector General launched an investigation into AED’s projects, finding 
that many were mismanaged and overcharged the US government by 
nearly $1 million under the leadership of Stephen Moseley. It was also 
found that AED as a whole was not fully cooperating with USAID’s 
investigation. The results were devastating for the company. It was 
stripped of any future contracts from the federal government due to 
"evidence of serious corporate misconduct, mismanagement,” and 
"serious concerns of corporate integrity."119 The loss of revenue forced the 
company to dissolve. This decision from USAID not only allowed it to 
recoup its money but also made the development community aware of 
the consequences of mismanaging projects.  
Another example of accountability was USAID and the Lewis Berger 
Group (LBG).  LBG has been involved in numerous projects all over Iraq 
and Afghanistan involving the construction of roads, schools, and 
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electrical plants.120  USAID found that the company intentionally 
overcharged the government a total of $15-20 million total on various 
projects. The consequences for LBG were $18.7 million in criminal 
penalties and $50.6 million in civil penalties. In addition, two former 
company officials were charged with fraud, pleaded guilty, and were sent 
to prison.121 USAID thus made an example of LBG, showing that taking 
advantage of government contracts will not be taken lightly.  
Accountability depends on available incentives that the US provides for 
their contractors. The most important positive incentive is already in 
place, which is receiving the contract and being able to obtain other 
contracts in the future. However, the US does not have many negative 
incentives, such as fines or even jail time, in place to motivate 
contractors to pursue their project according to the original plan. 
Contractors in many cases would be paid in full even though the project 
did not meet the required standards and would not be penalized when 
failing to adhere to the original plan. Providing and enforcing 
repercussions for such failures would create an incentive for them to 
complete the project on time, within budget, and to standard. 
Accountability is essential, especially if oversight is lacking on a project. 
Accountability enables the US or host nation government to enforce the 
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contractual provisions, ensuring successful project completion or 
obtaining compensation for non-compliance and losses suffered. 
Accountability keeps contractors in check. If accountability is not 
exercised, the host nation government and US agencies appear to be 
weak and easily taken advantage of. Holding these contracting agencies 
accountable for their actions also reinforces the rule of law for both the 
host nation government and US overseas operations.   
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Chapter 4: The Importance of the Success of Economic 
Development Projects 
 
If host nation capacity is not considered, efficient oversight is not 
performed, and accountability is not enforced, there is a good chance 
that the development project will fail. The consequences of one failed 
development project may be minimal, but a continuous stream of failed 
development projects will hinder US stability operations. The chief goal in 
stability operations, especially in a counterinsurgency context, is to 
improve the people’s perception of the host nation government, thereby 
increasing its public support and legitimacy.  
Perception 
 
The host nation 
population’s perception is 
one of the most important 
factors to consider when 
conducting stability 
operations. To change or 
reinforce the perception of 
the host nation 
government, military and 
development planners 
need to establish trust. Trust promotes collaboration and provides open 
Figure 3 Effects of Development Project Failure 
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communication channels to determine whether the US forces, the host 
nation government, and the local population share the same objective.122 
The effectiveness of development projects is dependent on how the host 
nation perceives its intended benefits since they rely on infrastructure to 
meet the needs for their survival.123 124 Local populations will support 
any group that meets their needs, whether it is the host nation or an 
insurgent group.125  
The deficiencies outlined in the previous chapters all have an effect on 
the public’s perception of the host nation government, which in turn 
affects the government’s legitimacy. Psychologically, an individual’s 
perceptions are often shaped by the perceptions of others. American 
psychologist Solomon Asch substantiated this idea in his study in which 
volunteers were asked to select a line from a choice of three that closely 
matched a separate fourth line. When they were asked to match the lines 
on their own, they correctly identified the two similar lines. However, 
when placed in a group setting with people that uniformly agreed on the 
wrong lines, 30 percent of the time the volunteers doubted their original 
answer and switched it to conform to the rest of the group.126 This 
finding was further reinforced by psychologists John Darley and Bibb 
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Latane who found that perception can also be shaped on a larger scale in 
societal context.127 These conclusions occur in social settings as well 
with regard to perception. The higher the percentage of the population 
that views a scenario to be positive or negative, the more likely people 
with opposing or uncertain views will conform to the rest of the 
population.  This could be beneficial or detrimental for the host nation 
government, depending on the views of the majority of the population. 
Furthermore, once individuals who have similar views are grouped 
together, those views tend to get more extreme. This effect is called group 
polarization.128 People tend to reinforce the opinions of others when they 
agree. Studies have found that after a discussion has taken place on a 
specific topic with individuals who share similar views, the attitudes 
pertaining to that particular subject intensify. In the context of stability 
operations, if a large portion of the population believes that the host 
nation government is not the legitimate authority, then, according to the 
conformity theory, a portion of the population that has opposing views 
will conform to the rest of the population and view the government as 
illegitimate. When a greater portion of the population views the 
government as illegitimate, according to the group polarization theory, 
some will move towards the more extreme side and could start 
supporting or participating in the insurgency.  





Given these findings, economic infrastructure development plays a 
crucial role in changing the perception of a population.  A World Bank 
Study found that local residents in communities that have had 
development projects implemented successfully are likely to view their 
economic situation more positively than in communities that didn’t have 
these projects. Also, populations in these areas were more supportive of 
the government. In areas which had moderate levels of violence, studies 
showed a decrease in the levels of violence, making the area more safe for 
residents and non-government organizations (NGOs) operating in the 
area as well as for US forces.129  
Legitimacy  
 
In basic terms, legitimacy is the government’s right to rule and plays an 
important role for the stability of a nation.130 The Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an organization that 
promotes economic policies in order to increase “social well-being of 
people around the world,” has stated that a “lack of legitimacy is a major 
contributor to state fragility because it undermines state authority, and 
therefore capacity”.131 Positive perception is needed for citizens to 
willingly involve themselves with the state. In order to create positive 
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perception, the state acts as a promoter of public goods and social 
services, among other things.132 In order for society to thrive, states are 
obligated to provide public goods when the average citizen alone cannot 
afford it and the market cannot provide it.133 If states are unable fulfil 
this, foreign aid is a common solution. Susan L. Woodward, author of 
“Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation” expresses the 
importance of public goods to legitimacy when she states, “The provision 
of services such as garbage collection, sewage, electricity, power plants, 
and sufficient, clean water are not only basic to health but also the best 
way to build confidence in the government.”134 
The OECD organized the sources of legitimacy into four categories. The 
first is input legitimacy, which is derived from rules and procedures that 
comprise the rule of law and are formulated by the government. The 
second is output legitimacy, which focuses on the government’s ability to 
effectively provide quality public goods. The third is shared beliefs in 
which legitimacy is formed through a sense of community, whether it is 
on a traditional, religious, or political level. The fourth is international 
legitimacy, or being recognized by the international community. OECD 
argues that a state does not rely on a single source of legitimacy, and 
while there may be two or even three sources, sometimes these sources 
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conflict with each other.135 OECD has also stated that security is the 
foundation of output legitimacy. It allows for other contributors to 
legitimacy, such as economic development, to be produced. This paper 
concentrates on the discussion of output legitimacy.   
Author Jean-Marc Coicaud, author of “Legitimacy and Politics” describes 
governance as an act of reciprocity with its citizens. Political legitimacy is 
derived from “the relationship between the individuals who command 
and those who obey.”136 The political institutions which govern a 
population guarantee public space and mitigate anything that threatens 
the social norms, whether emanating from domestic or foreign sources. 
When the population no longer consents to having a regime govern them, 
it is a sign that the legitimacy of the government has been lost. 
Legitimacy is based upon, to a large extent, public perception and plays 
an important role in the host nation’s authority in governing a country. 
The process of obtaining legitimacy sometimes is viewed as a transaction: 
the government provides public goods to the citizenry in return for their 
support and confidence.137 To be seen as legitimate, the state needs to be 
perceived as the “most reliable provider of basic public goods”138 and a 
provider of an “environment for the population to maintain predictable 
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and tolerable living conditions.”139 The level of legitimacy also indicates 
the extent to which the population accepts the authority and decisions of 
the government. Legitimacy also encompasses the trust that a citizen 
places in their government to handle security, and to perform economic, 
political, and social actions.140  
In a counterinsurgency environment, insurgent groups can exploit areas 
where the host nation government has failed to provide social goods and 
services such as schools or roadways, and gain legitimacy in the process. 
For instance, as reported by TIME magazine, in early 2007, the Afghan 
government was having trouble protecting teachers and schools in the 
southern provinces of Afghanistan. The Taliban had burned down 180 
schools and forced another 396 to close, preventing many children from 
attending school. Due to Afghan and US forces not being able to provide 
protection, the Taliban decided to take advantage of the situation and 
provide the social service themselves.141 The Taliban announced plans to 
start a $1 million education program to build schools in those regions 
where it had the most influence to give an “Islamically correct” 
education.142 The education program benefited the Taliban in two ways. 
First, it provided social services to the surrounding areas, enabling the 
Taliban to compete with the host nation government. Second, it created a 
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new tool for recruiting, enhancing their troop strength. This program 
thwarts the mission of the US and Afghan government of eradicating the 
Taliban presence from Afghanistan.  
The US military’s Joint Publication 3-24 states that a government’s 
legitimacy is based on five factors: mandate, manner, support, consent, 
and expectations.143 Mandate refers to the process by which the state 
gained authority over the population, such as through universal suffrage, 
a caste system, a coup, etc. The manner in which the government and 
leaders meet the expectations of the population also matters. Does the 
government listen to the population and provide for their needs? Are 
their methods corrupt? The state also needs public support and popular 
consent, in that the people must be willing to obey the government and 
abide by the rules established by the government. The population also 
needs to expect that the government will work for the people and not 
against them.144  
As important as legitimacy is for a host nation government, it is equally 
vital for foreign forces and personnel that are intervening in or assisting 
a country.  How US forces are perceived in a country is an important 
consideration when planning for operations.145 If the transition is 
conducted improperly or is poorly timed, the result could be the failure of 
the host nation to sustain the project, giving the appearance of the 
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inability of the host nation to function independently. It could also lead 
to negative opinions of the US, jeopardizing the security of future projects 
and working counter to the objective of regional security. Thus, project 
success has a strong influence on legitimacy.146  
When legitimacy is absent and political processes break down, intrastate 
violence has the potential to occur. Authority structures that were 
designed to establish stability in the region are no longer viewed as an 
authoritative presence.147  Rule of law collapses in this instance, leading 




Perception of legitimacy has a direct effect on the behavior of the 
population. If the people support the government and view the 
government as the sole authoritative presence in the country then a 
stable society should ensue. An unsupportive population, however, may 
engage in actions against the government, such as protests, and support 
for and/or participation in an insurgency. The only way peace can be 
obtained in an unstable country is if the population is committed to 
peace.148  
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The goal of all counterinsurgency operations is to change the behavior of 
the majority of the population so that they will either break away from 
the insurgency or stop supporting it.149 Behavior can be a key indicator 
of the effectiveness of economic infrastructure development, which can 
be seen by calculating the number of businesses in the area. Starting a 
business, especially in an underdeveloped or war torn country, requires 
a significant amount of investment with the belief that a breakeven point, 
where revenue meets expenses, will be reached in the near future. The 
willingness of people to invest money and start a business requires trust 
in the government to maintain stability in the area and improve the 
economic markets within the country. A rise in the number of businesses 
indicates a positive outlook on the future of the country, with a decline 
showing the opposite.150  
Another example of how perception changes the behavior of a population 
is school attendance. A high rate of school attendance reveals both 
public trust and improvement in household income. If parents are willing 
to send their children to school, they must trust the government and 
school officials to provide a safe environment for travel to and from 
school and a safe environment for education. If parents are willing to 
send their children to school, they also must not need their children to 
work to augment family income. Other behavioral indicators include 
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public service employment, military enrollment (which forces an 
individual to choose a side in a conflict), and support for the insurgency. 
Other Sources of Vulnerabilities Found in the Study 
 
Economic infrastructure development projects create other 
vulnerabilities to stability operations. The difference between these 
threats and the threats outlined in the previous chapters are where they 
arise from. The previous vulnerabilities outlined in this writing identified 
problems within the internal dynamics of the US and host nation 
government. These next vulnerabilities are external, where the 
insurgency has a direct role in creating a threat against the 
implementation of development projects.  
New Targets 
A SIGIR special report on the casualties endured during the 
implementation of development projects while in a combat zone 
concluded that “reconstruction or stabilization operations conducted in 
combat zones present potentially lethal threats to all participants, 
including military personnel, contractors, US government civilians, third-
country nationals, and host country citizens. Planning for such 
operations must anticipate this threat.”151 When an insurgency group 
attacks a project, they do it with the intent of preventing the host nation 
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from providing services to its population.152 To prevent such attacks from 
happening, the host nation improves their “civil security” which is 
defined as “the provision of security for state entities (including 
infrastructure) and the population, including protection from internal 
and external threats.”153 If protection for these projects is not adequately 
provided and the project is eventually attacked, not only will the public 
not be able to take advantage of the services but also tensions in the 
region may be inflamed.154 
Insurgents attack these projects in order to shift the balance of power in 
their favor and away from the host nation government. Frequently these 
attacks occur before the projects are even completed, so that the 
population never experiences the positive effects.155 If the attacks were to 
happen after the project was completed, the insurgency would be viewed 
as the group that took away badly needed public goods. Attacking at the 
construction phase also makes the government appear incapable of 
following through on their promises, and indicates that the government 
is unable to meet public expectations. A report from the Council on 
Foreign Relations in 2006 identified sabotage as the main reason why the 
Iraqi and US government were unable to supply the population with a 
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constant flow of electricity. Insurgent attacks on projects made the 
electrical grid at the time less reliable than it was during the Saddam 
era. Sabotage was also the reason for low oil production and fuel 
availability, which led to an increased usage of the black market.156   
Another aspect of these attacks is their effect on the contracting agency’s 
actions. Insurgents targeting specific areas, rather than projects, can 
lead to contractors being hesitant to work in those areas due to their 
concerns about the safety of the workers and the successful 
implementation of the project.157 Contractors are vital for project 
implementation and economic growth, especially if the contractors are 
from the host nation. If a contracting company views a project as risky or 
unprofitable, it is likely that they will not pursue it, preventing the 
project from being implemented.  
One example of this is road construction in Afghanistan, which has been 
an essential part of NATO’s counterinsurgency effort. Karl Eikenberry, 
the former Ambassador to Afghanistan, has confirmed himself that 
“where the road ends, the Taliban begins.”158 Road construction sites 
have been a constant target for the Taliban due to their prevalence in 
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Afghanistan.159 Although attacks have destroyed many project sites, the 
destruction of construction vehicles and the kidnapping of workers have 
proven to be more damaging. These attacks hinder the contractor’s 
ability to complete current and future projects. Not only is the progress 
of the current project slowed, but future projects are also jeopardized. 
The dangerousness of the environment may discourage individuals from 
working in that location. The limited availability of specialized labor in 
the area reduces the ability of the contractor to hire qualified personnel, 
to provide the necessary logistics, and to procure the required building 
material.160 
Unsecure roads were exploited not only by the insurgency but also by 
criminal elements. Often, criminal elements used these roads to set up 
tolls for drivers using them. They collect an illegal tax that benefited 
neither the host nation government nor the development agencies. Also, 
they took advantage of the limited security available on the road and 
robbed travelers.161 The people who are targeted for this realize that the 
government does not have a grip on security and cannot enforce rule of 
law, again hurting the legitimacy of their government.  
In Iraq, attacks on projects thwart successful completion of development 
projects and consequently deny benefits to the people. Because of the 
                                                          
159 Amiri, Mohammad Abid. "Road Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Afghanistan: A Cure 





attacks on projects, funding that normally went to development projects 
had to be diverted to improve the security in the area. Due to the 
diversion of funds and the attacks on projects, the scope of many 
development projects was reduced. For instance, in March 2005, USAID 
was forced to cancel to development projects that would have increased 
the power generation in southern Baghdad. These projects, which totaled 
around $15 million, were cancelled to help cover increased security costs 
in the region.162 In this case, the insurgents succeeded at preventing the 
project from being implemented, which had a negative effect on both US 
forces and the Iraqi government’s ongoing development mission. It 
negatively affected the local population in the region as well by 
preventing much needed development projects from being constructed. 
The insurgent threat drove away contractors, whose workers deemed the 
environment too dangerous. This type of action resulted in a wastewater 
plant that was intended to help the people in central Iraq to be delayed 
for nearly two months in 2005.163  
Economic Infrastructure Projects Becoming a Source of Income for the 
Insurgency 
Non-state actors such as insurgents, militias, and criminal groups often 
use infrastructure development projects as a source of revenue to fund 
their establishment, by requiring contracting companies to pay fees for 
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protection so that they will not get attacked.164  This activity is a well-
known problem; even by the staff at the American Embassy. Money that 
is supposed to be going to development projects is finding its way to the 
Taliban. Protection money in Afghanistan has become such a problem 
that in the higher levels of the Afghan government, there is an official 
office that handles these types of transactions and negotiations. On 
average, around 20% of the total value of contracts issued by the US is 
dedicated to paying off the Taliban. If this fee is not paid, the contractor 
risks having their employees killed or projects destroyed.165 Ghulam 
Arafat, a local war lord in Khost Province Afghanistan was found to be 
spending nearly $1 million a year on protection fees.166 A local Afghan 
contractor described this process when he was hired to construct a 
bridge stating: “The local Taliban commander called and said ‘don’t build 
a bridge there, we’ll have to blow it up.’ I asked him to let me finish the 
bridge, collect the money — then they could blow it up whenever they 
wanted. We agreed, and I completed my project.”167 Although the 
contractor did not pay a protection fee, it outlines the influence the 
Taliban has on local contractors who work for the US government. This 
makes cost estimates for infrastructure development projects increase 
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due to contractors including it in their budget. It also strengthens the 
insurgency the US coalition is trying to stop, giving them a steady source 
of revenue from the reconstruction of Afghanistan.  
In Iraq, insurgents would often extort from 5-20 percent of the value of 
contracts that were issued by the US government. Also, in a non-
monetary value form, much of the fuel that was supposed to be exported 
from Iraq was siphoned off into the black market, depriving the Iraqi 
government of desperately needed revenue that could have been used for 
providing public services and reducing their reliance on US funding and 
personnel.168  Iraqi officer Col. Yaseen Taha Rajeeb was assigned to the 
refinery and attempted to halt the ongoing theft. However, the corruption 
was so ingrained that the colonel stopped receiving paychecks and was 
soon fired for his actions.169 This shows that there are sources within the 
Iraqi government as well who are using public goods as a resource for 
their own personal income.  
Economic infrastructure development has an important effect on the 
missions of both the host nation government and of the US forces 
operating in the region. Short term development goals lay the foundation 
for long term development.170 If short term goals are not achieved, then 
long term goals are less likely to be achieved. The longer it takes to 
                                                          
168 Oppel, Richard. "Iraq’s Insurgency Runs on Stolen Oil Profits." The New York Times. 
March 15, 2008. Accessed March 24, 2015. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2009. 
77 
 
secure objectives, the longer it will take for the mission to be considered 






The United States finds itself participating in stability operations and 
counterinsurgency operations not only in the Middle East, but also all 
over the world. Understanding infrastructure’s role in economic 
development is vital to the success of the mission. Economic 
infrastructure development is a must, and therefore a valiant effort must 
be made to address the vulnerabilities infrastructure development 
creates so that the stability of a country is ensured, economic expansion 
is created, and the legitimacy of a host nation government is improved so 
as to benefit the entire population.  
US policy for international development is very idealistic and tends to 
ignore reality. It seeks to simply transfer capital and technical expertise 
to other countries, expecting economic growth to follow.171 US policy does 
not take into account the responsibility for overseeing the projects which 
includes holding contractors accountable for their contracts and 
ensuring the capacity of the host nation government to sustain the 
projects once the US pulls out of the area. There are many problems 
stemming from the agency level of management that have had direct 
effects on the lower level implementation of a project. It is important for 
the US to take these factors into account when conducting 
counterinsurgency, disaster response, or development operations if they 
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seek to transfer responsibility of maintaining the projects and improve 
the capacity of the host country. Also, in a counterinsurgency context, it 
is important to address these issues so that an insurgency cannot exploit 
them and use it to their advantage by either gaining support or hurting 
the image of the host nation government. In a time when the US is 
getting more involved in unstable countries as well as responding to 
more and more major crises, it is critical that the US identify faults 
within its policies now, before the next major conflict or disaster hits. 
This study sought to identify factors that lead to successful development 
project implementation from the macro and micro levels of a project in an 
underdeveloped area. It also outlined the effects successful project 
implementation has on the behavior of the local population and the 
legitimacy of both the host nation government and US forces carrying out 
stability operations. The study also looked at the feasibility of a project. If 
the host nation country does not have the capacity to maintain a 
development project, due to local factors such as location or size of the 
project, then the project should either be adapted to fit the conditions 
under which the host nation can sustain the project or be done away 
with all together. If the project is feasible, proper oversight should be 
implemented so as to ensure that the local environment of the project 
site is considered, the local community is incorporated into the planning, 
and execution stages, and flexibility is maintained to adapt to a changing 
environment and changing circumstances. Most oversight is conducted 
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on the project management level, involving project teams who work on 
the ground. Once the project is completed, the contracting agency should 
be held accountable for the actions they have taken. If the project was 
conducted improperly, due to such things as cost overruns, delayed 
completion, or faulty construction, the contractor should be held 
accountable through heavy fines or the loss of future contracts. Each of 
these consequences affects the revenue of the contracting company and 
will deter that company as well as other companies from poor 
performance in the future.   
My hypothesis was proven in that infrastructure projects do create 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the insurgency. What I did not 
expect, however, was that most of these vulnerabilities are preventable 
by the host nation government or the US. If these vulnerabilities are not 
addressed, the host nation government and US are hurting their mission 
and empowering the insurgency.   
Sustainability is an important factor that needs to be addressed in the 
project planning stages. Sustainability is achieved by appropriately 
matching projects with the capacity of the host nation and should direct 
the scope of a project. For example, a development organization or 
government agency wouldn’t want to build a hospital in an area where 
there is little to no road access, a condition that would make building the 
hospital difficult and resupplying it unsustainable.  
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This study found that oversight is an important aspect of development 
project implementation; specifically, efficient oversight on the project 
level has a greater impact on the success of a project than the agency or 
organizational level due to the project management teams having more 
influence over decisions regarding the project and the environment it is 
being constructed in. The team is able to make quicker decisions to solve 
problems regarding the project that could potentially derail any progress 
made. They also are able to better incorporate the community in project 
implementation so that local residents are trained to maintain the project 
and feel a sense of ownership. In some cases, when the community 
directed the projects, they proved to be more successful due to their 
knowledge on what areas needed to be developed. These findings are 
important to US policy as they will make development projects in 
counterinsurgency environments more effective and sustainable. Also, it 
will help boost the stability of allied nations that have gone through a 
transition in government.  
The findings of this study are essential to current and future stability 
operations that the US seeks to implement. If the findings are adapted, it 
could lead to more cost beneficial economic development projects and 
increased effectiveness and impact on the local population. This could 
prevent non-state actors such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda from gaining 
strength and empower nations with ongoing insurgencies to handle their 
own security, thereby reinforcing US strategic interests.  
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The scope of this issue is immense and more research needs to be done. 
This paper looked at two countries in which the US is conducting 
stability operations with active insurgencies. However, there are many 
other countries where the US is conducting stability operations that are 
outside the counterinsurgency scope. Haiti is a major area where 
stability operations are being conducted for humanitarian assistance. 
South Sudan is another area where the US is investing in capacity 
building for the government. There has been research conducted outside 
the scope of this paper that identifies issues similar to the ones reviewed 
in this paper. It would be interesting to see if these problems have the 
same effect on those governments.  
The United States is finding itself more and more involved in conflicts 
that involve non-state actors. Although some of these conflicts require 
direct military action, most often, the solution is the enhancement of 
host nation government capacity through feasible development projects 
that benefit the local populace, thereby legitimizing the host nation 
government and diminishing support for the insurgency. To ensure that 
our national security needs are met, the US needs to develop an effective 
and efficient method to deal with non-state actors while increasing the 
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Turkey, Syria, and Iraq for Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) graduate students, handling event execution logistics 
 Contributed to the design and research of a multi-college war game 
scenario on The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) and U.S. Government actors involved in overseeing 
foreign acquisition 
 Aided  in facilitating  exercises involving foreign military sales (FMS) 
and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) for the Reserve Components 
National Security Course (RCNSC)   
 Briefed information to scenarios developed for University to team 
personnel and senior officers 
Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, Middle 
East  
Israeli Policy Intern: February - June 2014  
 Developed talking points on Israeli defense relations for the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for a series of regional security 
meetings with Israeli Military Defense Attachés 
 Prepared a presentation on Department of Defense engagement with 
Egypt for the Assistant Secretary of Defense of Policy 
 Assisted Chief of Staff with outreach efforts to Joint Staff and Central 
Command to gather input on new policy decisions 
 Managed logistics for meetings with Defense Attachés from several 
Middle Eastern Embassies 
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Truman National Security Project | Center for National Policy  
Syrian Policy Intern: September - December 2013  
 Researched daily updates to the Syrian conflict for Policy Department 
staff talking points 
 Prepared detailed accounts of rebel groups involved in the Syria 
conflict, including Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIL, and the FSA 
 Drafted the Syria section of the annual report highlighting global 
security threats, including actors, chemical weapons, refugees, and 
other key issues 
 Performed outreach to congressional staff  on the Truman 
Congressional Security Scholars Program on National Security  
 Briefed Policy Department staff on Civilian-Military operations in 
conflict and post-conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa 
Office of Senator Christopher Coons (D-DE)  
Intern: September 2012 - December 2012  
 Prepared weekly current events briefings focused on African regional 
organizations, terrorist groups and foreign influence 
 Examined effects of the sequester on the Department of Defense in 
terms of research and development, staffing, and acquisition 
 Researched the U.S. response to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
and challenges the U.S. forces faced in completing their mission 
 Wrote informational briefings for the Senator on African countries 
including Zambia, Morocco, and Senegal 
American Islamic Congress (AIC)  
Legislative Assistant: October 2011 – December 2012  
 Supervised five interns on campaigns for the Northern Pakistani 
Kalash population and human rights violations in Saudi Arabia 
 Edited and revamped a Political Action Kit to encourage populations 
in post-Arab Spring to get involved in their democratic process 
 Conducted extensive research on the history of Afghanistan, the 
opposition in Syria, and the outcome of the Libyan intervention 
 Liaised with the Department of Justice to develop ways of combating 
Islamic extremism without profiling moderate Muslims 
 Coordinated efforts between AIC, the State Department, and the 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom to 
develop solutions to issues pertaining to international religious 
freedom, the persecution of Christian Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia and 
detained personnel in the Middle East due to blasphemy laws 
Fort Delaware State Park  
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Volunteer Coordinator, Firearms / Artillery Supervisor: June 2009 – October 2011  
 Oversaw a joint volunteer effort by Bank of America and Wal-Mart 
that saved the Park thousands of dollars in labor costs 
 Ran educational programs that included weapon demonstrations for 
the public and instructed new volunteers to the program  
 Performed extensive research on the role of Fort Delaware and Fort 




U.S. Army Reserve (E5 – Sergeant) 
Civil Affairs Specialist (38B): November 2012 – Present 
 Direct commission officer candidate 
 Active secret security clearance 
 Train to assist in the coordination of civilian / military development 
projects 
 Liaise with local government, non-profit and relief agencies to 
coordinate disaster response strategy 
 Trained extensively in negotiation and the gathering of information 
through human sources 
 Gained external training expertise in disaster response to both 
domestic and foreign countries 
Horizontal Construction Engineer (12N): January 2011 – November 2012 
 Skilled in the operation of heavy construction equipment needed in 
infrastructure development projects 





Fort Delaware State Park  
AmeriCorps Volunteer: 2009  
 Assisted in historical preservation of the park 
 Gained public speaking skills through teaching classes to the public  
University of Delaware 
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Student Advisor: 2007 - 2008 
 Coordinated groups of upper class students to speak to incoming 
students 





Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC  
M.A. in Global Security - May 2015   
Thesis: The Risks and Rewards of Investing in Economic Infrastructure 
Development in a Post Conflict Environment.  
University of Delaware, Newark, DE  
B.A. in History - September 2010  
